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SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER'S DILEMMA
By DONALD W. GRFIG**
A historical perspective of the rules of territorial acquisition and of Antarctic
sovereignty provides a basis for an examination of the conflict between international
law and state sovereignty. While there may not be any immediate redress against
the unlawful action of powerful states, the evolution of international law provides
a value system and rule-making capacity which does not grant legitimacy to such
actions.
I. THE DILEMMA ............................ 128
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW ... 131
II. TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION ................. 140
A. Origins ............................... 140
B. Disadvantages of the Requirement of Possession ... 145
1. Taking of Possession ................ .146
2. Territories having an Indigenous Population 148
C. Problems of applying the concept of occupatio .... 154
D. Subsequent developments in the law of tenitorial
acquisition ......................... 160
IV. ANTARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY .................. 163
V. THE DILEMMA RECONSIDERED .............. 169
a Copyright, 1988, Donald W. Greig.
**Professor of Law, Australian National University,' Laskin Visiting Professor, Fall
Semester 1986. This paper is based upon the Laskin Visiting Lecture delivered by Professor
Greig at Osgoode Hall Law School in November 1986.
OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL
L THE DILEMMA
International lawyers are often on the defensive about their
discipline. They are faced with attacks and criticisms from the legal
fraternity in general who sense that their discipline is different and
are perturbed by its very unfamiliarity, and from scholars of
international relations theory who perceive law as of marginal
relevance to the great events which mould the world in which nation
states struggle for power and survival. It is in this latter context
that the lawyer's dilemma is most starkly seen: how is it possible to
reconcile the notion of law as a mechanism for the control of
conduct with the ultimate claim of states to act as they -wish?
Symptomatic of what might be termed an "international
relations" approach was the work of Hedley Bull. In The Anarchical
Society,1 Bull wrote that what he called the "structure of
international coexistence" depended on "norms or rules conferring
rights and duties upon states - not necessarily moral rules, but
procedural rules or rules of the game which in modem society are
stated in some cases in international law." As for the role of
morality, Bull added that "ideas of interstate and international justice
may reinforce the compact of coexistence between states by adding
a moral imperative to the imperatives of enlightened self-interest
and of law on which it rests. '2  Despite this apparent
acknowledgement of some role for morality and justice, Bull's
message was essentially pessimistic. International order, he
continued, was "preserved by means which systematically affront the
most basic and widely agreed principles of international justice."3
1H. Bull, The Anarchical Societ (London: MacMillan, 1977) at 91 (emphasis added).
21bid at 91. As opposed to "ideas of world justice" which may seem entirely at odds with
the structure of international society and to "notions of human justice" which "entail a possible
threat to its foundations.
31bid By this Bull did not "mean simply that at the present time there are states and
nations which are denied their moral rights or fail to fulfil their moral responsibilities, or that
there is gross inequality or unfairness in their enjoyment of these rights, or exercise of
responsibilities. This is of course the case, but it has always been the case, and it is the
normal condition of any society. What I have in mind is rather that the institutions and
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Among the examples given by Bull were "the role ... played in
international order by the institution of the balance of power' 4 and
the function of war which "plays a central role in the maintenance
of international order, in the enforcement of international law, the
preservation of the balance of power and the effecting of changes
which a consensus maintains are just."5  In the last situation,
however, war might equally be "the instrument of overthrowing rules
of international law, of undermining the balances of power and of
preventing just changes or of effecting changes that are unjust.,
6
Nor is international law without its shortcomings. According to
Bull:
7
It is not merely that international law sanctifies the status quo without providing for
a legislative process whereby the law can be altered by consent and thus causes the
pressures for change to consolidate behind demands that the law should be violated
in the name of justice. It is also that when the law is violated, and a new situation
is brought about by the triumph not necessarily of justice but of force, international
law accepts this new situation as legitimate, and concurs in the means whereby it
has been brought about.... Moreover, contrary to much superficial thinking on this
subject, it is not as if this tendency of international law to accommodate itself to
power polities were some unfortunate but remediable defect that is fit to be
removed by the good work of some high-minded professor of international law or
by some ingenious report of the International Law Commission. There is every
reason to think that this feature of international law, which sets it at loggerheads
with elementary justice, is vital to its working; and that if international law ceased
to have this feature, it would so lose contact with international reality as to be
unable to play any role at all.
mechanisms which sustain international order, even when they are working properly, indeed
especially when they are working properly, or fulfilling their functions ... necessarily violate
ordinary notions of justice."
4/bila, described by Bull as "an institution which offends against everyday notions of
justice by sanctioning war against the state whose power threatens to become preponderant,
but which has done no legal or moral injury," to say nothing of the tendency to sacrifice "the
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Although some of Bull's views tend to be simplistic,8 they
do help illustrate the contrast or conflict between international law
(the mechanism for control) and international relations (the claim of
states to freedom of action in pursuit of their own self-interest).
His views are particularly open to criticism in so far as they are
based upon an outdated view of the differences between the
international legal order and municipal systems of law. In pointing
to the "limitations of the domestic analogy," Bull commented9 that
"[s]tates, after all, are very unlike human beings. Even if it could be
contended that government is a necessary condition of order among
individual men, there are good reasons for holding that anarchy
among states is tolerable to a degree to which among individuals it
is not." It is a debatable and scarcely verifiable proposition that
international society is more or less peaceful or orderly than
municipal society. It may be that the streets of Canberra, Oxford or
Toronto are relatively safe to the individual, at least partly because
of the presence of police. But this might not be true of areas of
Sydney, London, New York or Chicago. Moreover, where political
unrest verges on the edge of civil war, as in Northern Ireland or the
8This is certainly true of his distinction between a "society of states" - which he describes
as existing 'when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values,
form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of
rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" and
an "international system". For Bull, the former, (an international society), presupposes the
latter, but the latter (an international system) may exist that is not the former (ibid.at 13-
14). Thus, a system may exist where two or more states "may be in contact with each other
and interact in such a way as to be necessary factors in each other's calculations without their
being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving themselves to be bound by a
common set of rules, or cooperating in the working of common institutions" (ibid). 'The
unhelpful nature of this analysis is that while there may be intellectual value in positing
whether or not there is an international society or system, it is not of great assistance to
provide a definition likely to lead to the conclusion that there are a large number of
overlapping systems, some of which may be societies and others not. Illogically, Bull made
this approach the basis of a survey of the (single) anarchical society.
Even less acceptable is the chameleon nature of his concept. At one stage Bull adopted
a more normal use of international society when he observed that in "modern international
society ... there is no central authority able to interpret and enforce the law." (ibid. at 48).
Soon afterwards, he reverted to his defined meaning (though giving it a wholly global
interpretation) in suggesting that "international society is no more than one of the basic
elements at work in modern international politics, and is always in competition with the
elements of a state of war and of transnational solidarity or conflict" (ibid at 51).
9 Bid at 49.
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townships of South Africa, international society might seem, by
comparison, to be a haven of relative peace. Even within apparently
stable domestic societies there can exist an underworld of violence
or threatened violence through the imposition of rules which are
completely different from those by which ordinary citizens lead their
lives. Anarchy (in the sense of lawlessness, including the regulation
of conduct by rules which are outside or even contrary to the
recognised legal code) is neither exclusively nor predominantly the
preserve of the international community.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW
Despite Bull's apparent rejection of the value of analogy
between international law operating on the relations of states and
municipal law governing the activities of individuals, there are a
number of parallels worth drawing.
At one level, the legal nature of the two systems share
similarities because of the role played by lawyers as rule selectors.
The judge or jurist expounds the law, though for different purposes,
not least because their perceptions as to the function of law and
their objective in defining it might differ. The attorney or adviser
is employed to carry out certain tasks, such as achieving a particular
aim (that is, draw up a treaty or contract), or to solve a problem
that has arisen in a situation where a cIaini has already been made
or litigation threatened.
At a less superficial level, both legal orders are based upon
community values, whether those values are promoted in the
interests of a few or of a majority. It is hardly surprising that states
or groups of states (like the powerful interest groups which operate
in the municipal sphere) seek to develop a conception of law and
rules that suit their interests and further the objectives that they
regard as important.
The very interdependence of states establishes the need for
a basic degree of orderliness in their relations. The similarity
1988]
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between the international arena and the municipal sphere in this
regard was drawn by Henkin in the following passages:
10
As for international law, much misunderstanding is due to a failure to recognise law
where it exists. That failure may be due to a narrow conception of law generally.
The layman tends to think of domestic law in terms of the traffic policeman, or
judicial trials for the thief or murderer. But law is much more and quite different.
I do not invoke any esoteric or eccentric definition of law when I say that in
domestic society law includes the scheme and structure of government, and the
institutions, forms, and procedures whereby a society carries on its dhily activities;
the concepts that underlie relations between government and individual and between
individuals; the status, rights responsibilities, and obligations of individuals and
incorporated and non-incorporated associations and other groups, the relations into
which they enter and the consequences of these relations. Men establish families,
employ one another, acquire possessions and trade them, make arrangements, join
groups for ill or good, help or hurt each other, with little thought to law and little
awareness that there is law that is relevant. By law, society formalises these
relationships, creates new ones, legitimates some and forbids others, determines the
content and consequences of relationships. The individual remains hardly or hazily
aware that he is enmeshed and governed by "law"....
In relations between nations, too, one tends to think of law as consisting of a few
prohibitory rules (for instance, that a government may not arrest another's
diplomats or the law of the U.N. Charter prohibiting war) but international law is
much more and quite different. Although there is no international "government,"
there is an international "society"; law includes the structure of that society, its
institutions, forms, and procedures for daily activity, the assumptions on which the
society is founded and the concepts which permeate it, the status, rights,
responsibilities, obligations of the nations which comprise that society, the various
relations between them, and the effects of those relations. Through what we call
foreign policy, nations establish, maintain, change, or terminate myriads of relations;
law - more or less primitive, more or less sophisticated - has developed to
formalise these relationships, to regulate them, to determine their consequences.
The misapprehension of this position as far as international
law is concerned is due to the lack of publicity given to the more
10L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, 2d ed. (New Yorn F.A. Praeger, 1979) at 13-15. Not
that Bull would deny the need for rules establishing orderliness, though he downplayed the
need for such rules to be legal. As he himself suggested (supra, note 1 at 54):
Order in any society is maintained not merely by a sense of common interests in
creating order or avoiding disorder, but by rules which spell out the kind of
behaviour that is orderly. Thus the goal of security against violence is upheld by
rules restricting the use of violence; the goal of stability of agreements by the rule
that they should be kept; and the goal of stability of possession by the rule that
rights of property, public or private, should be respected. These rules may have the
status of law, of morality, of custom or etiquette, or simply operating procedures
or 'rules of the game'.
[you- 26 NO. I
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normal operations of the system. As McDougal and Reisman have
pointed out:
11
The most pervasive popular conceptions of the contemporary international system
are derived from the incomplete and often anecdotal images of mass media. As
many have observed, these images tend to emphasize crisis and conflict; the
mundane but less dramatic patterns of inter-stimulation, inter-dependence and
collaboration are less likely to win large audiences, high ratings and great
advertising revenues.
Even if one does accept the concept of a legal system,
including the international system, as emanating from a society in a
form which reflects a compromise betweens the competing interests
of groups within that society, there are obvious and significant
differences between international law and municipal law.
In the international sphere, the absence of a legislature or
courts with universal competence are patent manifestations of the
absence of a law-maker. This law-making process is left, therefore,
to states themselves. What the law is depends upon what they say
or do. Hence, Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice stresses as the primary means for the determination of
rules of law:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognised by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law....
It is possible for conventional rules to come into existence by
virtue of the legal act which signifies the entry into force of the
instrument in question for parties to it. But, the emergence of
customary rules is dependent upon a process of action and reaction
which constitutes the necessary acceptance of that particulir pattern
of conduct as normative. It follows that, if international law is to
have the capacity to change, other than through the unlikely event
of a near universal treaty that is contemporaneously ratified by all
or most contracting parties, then allowance must be made for
actions by states that are contrary to an existing rule.
11"International Law in Policy-Oriented Perspective' in R. SL . Macdonald and D.M.
Johnston, eds, The Strucure and Proces of Intematonal Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy,
Doctrine and 7heory (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) at 103.
19881
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It may be necessary to assess the legality of a State's actions
by reference to an initial classification and to a later re-examination
in the light of subsequent events. It is in this context that there is
force to Bull's contention that, when the law is violated and a new
situation is brought about, international law will accept the change
as legitimate. 2 However, if international law has any claim to be
considered as sufficiently analogous to municipal systems of law to
merit being classified as law, there must be some methodology for
testing whether the illegitimate conduct will remain proscribed, or
will, in time, become accepted as the basis of a new legal rule.
There is no such problem for municipal law where the illegitimate
conduct of the individual or group of individuals will be de jtre
illegal13 until the law is changed by clearly identifiable processes.
There are two possibilities in the international arena. First,
acquiescence of the other party to a particular confrontation will
legitimize the conduct inter partes and may, considering other
evidence of state practice, suggest that a hew rule is emerging to
replace the old 4 Second, even if there is objection to the conduct
in question, the attitude of other states will be of crucial
significance! 5 That is, when faced with an action that is contrary to
12 Quoted supra, note 7.
13Even here, in the interim, conduct might achieve a de facto legitimacy from the fact
that authorities refrain from prosecuting the protestors pending an attempt to achieve
legislative reform. Certainly, there is a degree of unreality in the view of municipal society
as being free of breaches of the law designed to bring about social or political change. As
R.A. Falk wrote in The Status of Law in International Society (Princeton, Na.: Princeton
University Press, 1970) at 22-23:
Even in domestic society, threats and symbolic eruptions of violence are the motive
force behind a successful social protest on a fundamental issue. Contentions that
social and political change can be adequately assured by processes of persuasion
appear to reflect a dubious interpretation of human experience; at best, such
contentions represent slogans that have been uncritically built into democratic
ideology. It would appear that this relationship between violence and change applies
a fortiori to international society.
1 4As occurred in the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C. Rep. 116.
15 It seems unnecessary to refer a Canadian audience to theArctic Waters uisdiction Act,
1970, the accompanying diplomatic interchanges between Canada and the United States, and
to the subsequent provisions of Part XII of the Law of the Sea Conventions,1982. Nor, for
the purposes of the present exposition, is it necessary to construct an explanatory edifice for
[VOi- 26 NO. 1
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international law, reacting states can be divided into categories: the
subjective reactors who are involved because of a personal interest
and the objective reactors who, although not personally involved, are
able to provide a community response.1 6 The reaction may well
depend upon the nature and circumstances of the breach. The
more reasonable and justifiable the breach is, in terms of future
legal development, the less likely will it encounter an unfavourable
response. As Falk has argued:
1z
... the degree and manner of violation may be more crucial than the alleged fact of
violation. The possibility that a violation of international law may be a matter of
degree should be introduced explicitly into international legal theory. A conception
of compliance and of violation that draws inspiration from the idea of a spectrum
or a prism, rather than insists upon a rigid dichotomy between legal or illegal
conduct, would appear well adapted to a largely decentralised legal system such as
exists in international society.
International law is based upon custom18 and the range of
issues which the law has to answer is subject to rapid change.
Therefore, it is not "a mere static body of rules but is rather a
whole decision-making process."19 In examining this process of what
the creation and identification of rules of international law as complete as that provided in
M. Bos, A Methodology of International Law (New York: North Holland, 1984).
16The dividing line between the two cannot always be drawn with certainty. However,
it is a helpful distinction in that it brings out the need to examine the motives of states for
their actions.
1 7Supra, note 13 at 26.
18Even many conventional rules were originally, and still are for some states, applicable
as part of customary international law: seeNorth Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic
of Gennany v. Denmarl; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands) [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 3.
19M.S. McDougal, 'Ihe Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea"
(1955) 49 Am. J. Int. L 356; M.S. McDougal et aL, Studies in World Public Order (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1960) at 1014-16; and for critical analysis see Fall; supra,
note 13 at 642-59. Or, as A. Sheikh, International Law and National Behaviour (New York:
J. Wiley, 1974) at 47, expressed what he regarded as the distinctive features of international
law:
(1) It is a legal phenomenon but heavily deperident on political considerations,
because it is generally the outcome of a successful political process ...
(4) It is no longer, perhaps never was, a mere "body of rules" and should not be
characterised as such.
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states do and say, the question has been raised as to whether both
action and words are components of practice, or whether a
distinction between them need be made.
D'Amato was of the firm view that pronouncements made on
behalf of a state did not constitute part of state practice. Such
claims were of value only in so far as they provided an articulation
of the rule as opinio juris:
20
Many contradictory rules may be articulated, but a state can only act in one way
at one time. The act is concrete and usually ambiguous. Once the act takes place,
the previously articulated rule that is consistent with the act takes on life as a rule
of customary law, while the previously articulated rules contrary to it remain in the
realm of speculation. The state's act is visible, real, and significant; it crystallises
policy and demonstrates which of the many possible rules of law the acting state has
decided to manifest. The conjunction of rule and action becomes a powerful
precedent for future similar situations ....
... In most cases, a state's action is easily recgnised.... On the other hand, a claim
is not an act. As a matter of daily practice, international law is largely concerned
with conflicting international claims. But the claims themselves, although they may
articulate a legal norm, cannot constitute the material componeiit of custom. For
a state has not done anything when it makes a claim; until it takes enforcement
action, the claim has little value as a prediction of what the state will actually do.
On the other hand, the predominant view is probably that
expressed by McDougal. He believed that what states say is equally
important to what they do, thus constituting the corpus of state
practice from which customary international law might be deduced.
Having suggested that international law is "a whole decision-making
process," McDougal continued 21
(5) It is more of a process than anything else, subject to frequent changes and
interpretation at a time when it is being applied to concrete acts of state.
20A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (New York. Cornell Univ.
Press, 1971) at 88. Sir G.G. Fitzmaurice adopted a similar view. He stated in "Some
Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law' Symbolae Verzijl (Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1958) at 153:
... if State practice ... is a source of law, it would be incorrect to regard such things
as documents embodying diplomatic representations, notes of protest, eta, as
constituting sources of law. They are evidences of it because they demonstrate
certain attitudes on the part of States, but is [sic] the State practice so evidenced
which is the source of law.
2 1M.S. McDougal, 'The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea"
(1955) 49 Am. 3. Int. L 356 at 356-57.
[VOL. 26 NO. 1
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The international law of the sea is ... a process of continuous interaction, of
continuous demand and response, in which the decision-makers of particular nation
states unilaterally put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting character
to the use of the world's seas, and which other decision-makers, external to the
demanding state including both national and international officials, weigh and
appraise these competing claims in terms of the interests of the world community
and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject them. As such a process,
it is a living, growing law, grounded in the practices ... of ... state officials, and
changing as their demands and expectations are changed by the exigdncies of new
interests and technology and by other continually evolving conditions in the world
arena.
The McDougal view is undoubtedly correct in that collections
of state practice issued by or on behalf of various foreign offices
comprise mainly statements as to the attitudes of the individual state
concerned as expressed by its officials. The d'Amato approach
introduces a cautionary note of realism. To pay too high a regard
to what states say is to risk being accused of gullibility. Lawyers
suffer from undue deference to words. While this may not be too
harmful a characteristic when dealing with the text of a statute or a
judgment in municipal law, such deference is misplaced when
confronted with the pronouncements of politicians or officials on the
international plane. It is especially inappropriate in a situation
where the words used are no more than a pretext for blatantly
inconsistent actions. The following is an attempt by the
International Court to give words their face value: 2
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules
in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States would have refrained,
with complete consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each
other's internal affairs. The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be
established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous
conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the
Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent
with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule
should generally be treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the
recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way *prima facie incompatible with
a recognised rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or
justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's
conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to
confirm rather than to weaken the rule.
22Military and Paramilitary Activides in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America) Merits, [1986] I.CJ. Rep. 14 at 98.
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One may have sympathy with the situation with which the
International Court was faced. Yet, it is hardly flattering to the
cause of international law as an intellectual discipline for the Court
itself to suggest that, in the circumstances, such conduct has the
effect of confirming rather than weakening the rule in question.
Scholars of international relations do not suffer from the same
inhibitions. They are justifiably skeptical of what states say. For
them, actions speak louder than words. If the activities of states
conform to a particular pattern there is no need to attach the
soubriquet "law." It may be necessary to the orderly conduct of
international relations to recognise rules which are not "legal."
Predictability can be achieved independently of legal controls.
Amongst the "rules of the game" thus recognised are those
relating to the hegemony of the superpowers: the Soviet Union in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the United States in the
Caribbean and Central America.23 The existence of these rules
poses obvious difficulties for the international lawyer. To what
extent should such practices be recognised as giving rise to legal
norms?
The arena of superpower politics is not the only field of
conduct which creates problems for the lawyer. In the attempt to
give legal content to demands, especially of Third World countries,
for a variety of rights (for example, the right to food, to an
ecologically balanced environment, to development),24  some
international lawyers have made use of a theoretical distinction
between hard and soft law. There was a difficulty in establishing
these rights according to the rigorous requirements envisaged by
Article 38.1 (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
which speaks of "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law." It was interpreted by the International
23See P. Keal, Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance (London: MacMillan, 1982).
24See S.P. Marks, "Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980's?" (1981)
33 Rutgers L. Rev. 435 at 442-44. For the right to development, see 0. Schachter, 'rhe
Evolving International Law of DevelopmenV (1976) 15 Colum. . of Transnat'l L 1; R.Y.
Rich, "The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right" (1982-83) 23 Virginia 3.
Int. L. 287.
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Court in the Asylum case 5 to involve the need to prove both "a
constant and uniform usage" and that the usage amount to "the
expression of a right".
It was felt necessary by the principal protagonists of such
rights to argue for their legal recognition by reference to less
demanding criteria. Rules which fell into the former category as
satisfying the characteristics sought for by the International Court
could be classified as "hard". Those falling into the latter were
regarded as "soft"?6 The trend was towards accepting as law a
variety of rights, largely designed to balance the economic equation
between the rich and poor states of the world, which fell far short
of the criteria laid down by the International Court. This
development was in danger of going too far and led some of its
supporters to argue for the application of at least minimum
standards to the assessment of claims that such new rights should be
acknowledged as constituting "soft law".
2 7
Contemporary debates about hard and soft law, are only
peripheral issues in this discussion. We are concerned with the
dilemma facing the international lawyer in trying to reconcile the
need for certainty and stability inherent in the legal order with the
25.Asylum Case (Columbia v. Pu), [1950] I.CJ. Rep. 266 at 276. Or, as the Court said
subsequently in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), [1969] I.CJ. Rep. 3 at 44:
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also
be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
2 6see generally L Seidl-Hohenveldern, "International Economic 'soft law" (1979 - II) 163
Academie de Droit Int'l Rec. des Cours 169; J. Gold, "Strengthening the Soft International
Law of Exchange Arrangements" (1983) 77 Am. J. Int. L. 443. An alternative use of the
terminology is where hard law is taken as referring to rules of precise content, while soft law
would signify rules which lack precision, but which are nevertheless of a binding nature: see
P. Well, 'Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?" (1983) 77 Am. 3. Int. L. 413
at 414, n. 7. Soft law could also signify agreements between states which do not, for a variety
of reasons, constitute precise treaty obligations. See 0. Schachter, 'The Twilight E'istence
of Nonbinding International Agreements" (1977) 71 Am. J. Int. L 296; M. Bothe, "Legal and
Non-legal Norms - A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?" (1980) 11 Neth.
Y.B. Int. L 65; R.R. Baxter, "International Law in 'Her Infinite Variety"' (1980) 29 I.CLQ.
549.
27see P. Alston, "Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control"
(1984) 78 Am. 3. Int. L. 607.
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demand for change and the tendency of states, when their interests
so require, to act in a way that is inconsistent with existing legal
rules. A major illustration of how this reconciliation has been made,
throughout the life of the present state system, is provided by the
rules of territorial acquisition.
IE. TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION
A Origins
In the fifteenth century there were no rules, save those for
absorption by conquest or cession, because international relations
was not concerned with uninhabited or newly discovered territories.
The only exception concerned islands newly emerged from the sea,
which were res nuiius and could be acquired by occupatio. This
principle applied in favour of the landowner who acquired
dominium. If the landowner happened to be a prince, he would
acquire imperium by virtue of the act of occupation.
The expansion of Europe, which commenced in the middle
of the fifteenth century, presented entirely new problems as far as
the regulation of relations between states was concerned.28 With
the initial Portuguese discoveries, the issues raised related solely to
the relationship between the discoverer and the discovered. On the
basis that the world belonged to God and that all its inhabitants
were subject to His commands, Papal approval was s6ught for
Portugal's activities. Hence, the Bull Romanus Pontfex,29 issued by
Pope Nicholas V on 8 January 1455, authorised Portugal to
subjugate lands inhabited by infidels and confirmed Portuguese
claims to Africa and lands beyond toward India.
28Much of the material upon which this section is based comes from Donald NV. Greig,
"Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands Crisis" (1983) 8 Aust. Y.B. Int. L. 20.
29Text in S.Z. Ehler & 3.B. Morrall, Church and State through the Centuries (New York:
Biblo and Tannen, 1967) at 144-46.
[VOL 26 No. I
1988] The International Lawyer's Dilemma
The first dispute came with Christopher Columbus' first
voyage. Were his discoveries Spanish or Portuguese? Although his
expedition had sailed under the aegis of the Spanish crown, there
were a number of factors which supported Portuguese pretensions.
A Genoan by origin, Columbus had become a resident of Portugal,
where he had married. More importantly, the lands he discovered
were believed to be part of the "Indies" and so, according to the
1455 grant, were already allocated to Portugal. Given the
circumstances, it is not surprising that the two most Catholic States
of Europe should turn to the Pope as arbiter, law-giver and God's
representative. The outcome of this appeal to the Pope was the
Bull Inter Caetera Divinae of 4 May 1493 which provided:
3 0
And, in order that you may enter upon so great an undertaking with greater
readiness and heartiness endowed with the benefit of our apostolic favor, we, of our
own accord, not at your instance nor the request of anyone else in your regard, but
of your own sole largess and certain knowledge and out of the fullness of apostolic
power, by the authority of Almighty God conferred upon us in blessed Peter and
of our vicarship of Jesus Christ, which we hold on earth, do by tenor of these
presents, should any of said islands have been found by your envoys and captains,
give, grant, and assign to you and your heirs and successors, kings of Castile and
Leon, forever, together with all their dominions, cities, camps, places, and villages,
and all rights, jurisdictions, and appurtenances, all islands and mainlands found and
to be found, discovered and to be discovered towards the west and south, by
drawing and establishing a line from the Arctic Pole, namely the north, to the
Antarctic pole, namely the south, no matter whether the said mainlands and islands
are found and to be found in the direction of India or towards any other quarter,
the said line to the distant one hundred leagues towards the west and south from
any of the islands commonly known as the Azores and Cape Verde. With this
proviso however that none of the islands and mainlands, found and to be found,
discovered and to be discovered, beyond that said line towards the west and south,
be in the actual possession of any Christian ing or prince up to the birthday of
our Lord Jesus Christ just past from which the present year one thousand four
hundred and ninety-three begins. And we make, appoint, and depute you and your
said heirs and successors lords of them with full and free power, authority, and
jurisdiction of every kind; with this proviso however, that by this our gift, grant, and
assignment no right acquired by any Christian prince, who may be in actual
possession of said islands and mainlands, prior to the said birthday of our Lord
Jesus Christ, is hereby to be understood to be withdrawn or taken away. Moreover
3 0Text taken from F.G. Davenport, European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United
States and its Dependencies, vol. 1 (Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1967) at 77-78. The
geographical division was later amended by the Treaty of Tordesillas,1494 (text in Davenport
at 95-96) running from pole to pole, "one hundred leagues towards the east and south from
any of the islands commonly known as The Azores and Cape Verde" as laid down in the Bull
of 1493, to a line "at a distance of three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde
Islands"
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we command you in virtue of holy obedience that, employing all due diligence in
the premises, as you also promise - nor do we doubt your compliance therein in
accordance with your loyalty and royal greatness of spirit - you should appoint to
the aforesaid mainlands and islands worthy, God-fearing, learned, skilled, and
experienced men, in order to instruct the aforesaid inhabitants and residents in the
Catholic faith and train them in good morals. Furthermore, under penalty of
excommunication late sentende to be incurred ipso facto, should anyone thus
contravene, we strictly forbid all persons of whatever rank, even imperial and royal,
or of whatsoever estate, degree, order, or aforesaid heirs and successors, to go for
the purpose of trade or any other reason to the islands or mainlands, found and to
be found, discovered and to be discovered, towards the west and south, by drawing
and establishing a line from the Arctic pole to the Antarctic pole, no matter
whether the mainlands and islands, found and to be found, lie in the direction of
India or toward any other quarter whatsoever, the said line to be distant one
hundred leagues towards the west and south, as is aforesaid, from any of the islands
commonly known as the Azores and Cape Verde; apostolic constitutions and
ordinances and other decrees whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding....
There are a number of aspects of this instrument which need
to be emphasized. First, it was framed as a grant or assignment of
lands; those already discovered and those yet to be discovered. The
Bull was, therefore, designed and received as a root of title: it
constituted law for the parties and was intended to be operative vis-
Ll-vis third parties. Second, it was patently a classical example of an
allocation of disputed land by the definition of a boundary between
the respective territories of the parties. In order to given effect to
this allocation, the Treaty of Tordesillas,1494 made detailed
provision for the drawing of the boundary by what amounted to a
commission of representatives from the two countries?' Third, it
31According to the Davenport translation (supra, note 30 at 96), clause 3 of the Treaty
provided: Item, in order that the said line or bound of the said division be made straight and
as nearly as possible of the said distance of three hundred and seventy leagues west
of the Cape Verde Islands, as hereinbefore stated, the said representatives of both
the said parties agree and assent that within the ten months immediately following
the date of this treaty their said constituent lords shall despatch two or four
caravels, namely, one or two by each one of them, a greater or less number, as they
may mutually consider necessary. These vessels shall meet at the Grand Canary
Island during this time, and each one of the said parties shall send certain persons
in them, to wit, pilots, astrologers, sailors, and any others they may deem desirable.
But there must be as many on one side as on the other, and certain of the said
pilots, astrologers, sailors, and others of those sent by the said King and Queen of
Castile, Aragon, eta, and who are experienced, shall embark in the ships of the said
King of Portugal and the Algarves; in like manner certain of the said persons sent
by the said King of Portugal shall embark in the ship or ships of the said King and
Queen of Castile, Aragon, eta; a like number in each case, so that they may jointly
study and examine to better advantage the sea, courses, winds, and the degrees of
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laid down a principle of exclusive sovereignty by forbidding "all
persons of whatever 'rank' from going "to the islands or mainlands,
found or to be found" in the allocated areas "for the purpose of
trade or any other reason.'3
2
the sun or of north latitude, and lay out the leagues aforesaid, in order that, in
determining the line and boundary, all sent and empowered by both the said parties
in the said vessels, shall jointly concur.
32The process of conflict and accommodation in the development of international law can
also be seen in the varying claims made by coastal states- to maritime jurisdiction. These
claims took two major forms. The more extreme form was jurisdiction or sovereignty over
entire seas or sea areas. A number of European states, including Britain, claimed such rights:
see, A.P. Higgins & CJ. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, rev'd ed. (London:
Longman Green & Co., 1945) at 38-39, 41-42. The more significant examples related to
attempts by Portugal and Spain to employ the doctrine of mare clausum to protect their
trading monopoly with the new territories to which they became entitled under the 1493 Bull.
It was a conflict that was waged by the sword and by the pen. Grotius' work, Mare Liberunm
(1609), was an attack against such pretensions: see T.W. Fulton, The Sovereignly of he Sea
(Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. Microfilms, 1911) at 338 ff. Despite Queen Elizabeth's earlier views
to the contrary, it was the English who were Grotius' chief opponents and a major
preoccupation. This opposition arose from Britain's claims to control the narrow seas around
its shores. The other basis of jurisdiction was the notion, emanating from the Italian city
states, that a state was entitled to exercise control for two day's sailing distance (100 miles)
from its shores, partly to protect its own interests, and partly to protect the rights of all
mariners from the dangers of piracy (ibid. at 539-41). Although such a doctrine was never
formally adopted by English courts, it was a factor in diplomatic correspondence of the early
17th century (ibid at 360-61).
Fulton suggested that this latter concept survived only in the Mediterranean Sea until the
18th century. He failed to mention that it remained a matter of discord and conflict in
relations between Spain and its rival colonizers in the Americas. J. Goebel, in The Struggle
for the Falkland Islands (Vashington: Kennikat Press, 1927) at 186, fn. 40, suggested that the
guarda costas was increased in size in 1732. Therefore the 100 mile limit and the notion of
more clausum were being enforced in the Americas well past the middle of the century.
Indeed, Article XII of the Treat , of Utrecht 1713 granted rights to French fishermen in
waters 30 leagues from the coast of Nova Scotia. This provision only makes sense if a
coastal state was then recognised as having the authority to exclude foreigners from such areas.
It was this provision that was referred to by the Russians to justify their Ukase of 1821.
This instrument applied to the coasts and waters of the west coast of America from the
Behring Straits to 51oN. It excluded all foreign vessels, inter alia, not just from landing on
the coasts and islands of the region, but also from approaching them within less than 100
Italian miles. Both the British and Americans were concerned to depict such claims as totally
devoid of legal foundation. It seems reasonable to suppose that they were compatible with
the former views espoused by Spain, the overseas Empire in the Americas of which had only
recently disintegrated.
The only reservation one can have about the otherwise thorough examination of the
Dixon Entrance dispute by C.B. Bourne & D.M. McRae is their failure to give due weight
to the historical continuity of such claims. (See, "Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance:
The Alaska Boundary Re-examined" (1976) 14 Can. Yb. Int. L 175). Whether or not Russia
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The legal principle upon which these allocations of territory
were based, was essentially the dispositive authority claimed for
himself by the Pope and recognised by Spain and Portugal. It
placed the second wave of colonizers (Le. the French, the English
and the Dutch), at a disadvantage. It was necessary for them to
advance some alternative basis for territorial acquisition. They relied
upon the propositi6n that "no one is sovereign of a thing which he
himself has never possessed, and which no one else has ever held in
his name.'33 Even earlier, in her famous reply of 1580 to the
Spanish Ambassador Mendoza who had complained about Drake's
incursions on Spanish territory during his voyage around the world,
Queen Elizabeth had asserted that:.3
she would not persuade herself that (the Indies) are the rightful property of Spanish
donation of the Pope of Rome in whom she acknowledged no prerogative in
matters of this kind, much less authority to bind Princes who owe him no
obedience, or to make that New World as it were a fief for the Spaniard and clothe
him with possession: and that only on the ground that the Spaniards have touched
here and there, have erected shelters, have given names to a river or promontory:
acts which cannot confer property. So that this donation of res alienae which by
actually exercised the powers asserted in the 1821 Ukase was not crucial, (despite what was
stated in the context of the Fur Seal arbitration of 1893 in J.B. Moore, International
Arbitrations, vol. 1 (vashington: Government Printing Office, 1898, 755 at 948), to the issue
of the interpretation of the Russo-British Convention of 1825 upon which United States rights
as against Canada (and vice versa) in the Dixon Entrance are in part ultimately based.
Certainly the United States argued in its case to the tribunal that the Ukase had been
regarded by Russia as merely declaratory of existing rights (ibid at 810) and that, in any case,
extensive maritime claims of the sort in issue were recognised in international law (ibid at
811). The rejection of such claims by the tribunal may have been an assertion of international
law as it existed in 1893 and as it was to exist for the ensuing half century or more. This
does not mean that the tribunal's views were an accurate representation of the legal situation
in the critical period 1821-25.
33H.Grotius, Mare Liberum trans. R. van D. Magoffin c.1633 text (New York. Oxford
University Press, 1916) at 11. The section from which this quotation is taken was part of a
tirade against Portuguese pretensions to the East Indies with which the Dutch claimed the
right to trade. Thus, Grotius went on to assert that, as possession was a prerequisite of
sovereignty, "in those places the Portuguese have no title at all to sovereignty" (ibid).
34 This version is taken from Goebel, supra, note 32 at 63. For a more authentic version,
see A. Darcie, The True and Royall History of the Famous Empresse Elizabeth Queene of
England (1625) being a translation of the first three parts of IV. Camden, Annales renn
Anglicarum et Hibemicarum regnante Elizabetha ad annum salutis MDL X from the French
edition of P. de Bellegent (London: Richard Field, 1624), reproduced in H.R. Wagner, Sir
Francis Drake's Voyage round the World (San Francisco: H. Howell, 1926) repr. 1969, at 323.
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law (exjurc) is void, and this imaginary proprietorship, ought not to hinder other
princes from carrying on commerce in these regions and from establishing colonies
where Spaniards are not residing, without the least violation of the law of nations,
since without possession prescription is of no avail (haud vateat), nor yet from
freely navigating that vast ocean since the use of the sea and air is common to all
men; further that no right to the ocean can inure to any people or individual since
neither nature nor any reason of public use permits occupation of the ocean.
By the middle of the eighteenth century it would seem that
the Anglo-Dutch view as to the need for actual occupation to
perfect title to territory had prevailed. Thus, the Swiss jurist, Vattel,
was able to write: s5
All mean have an equal right to things which have not yet come into the possession
of anyone, and these things belong to the person who first takes possession. When,
therefore, a Nation finds a country uninhabited and without an owner, it may .
lawfully take possession of it, and after it has given sufficient signs of its intention
in this respect, it may not be deprived of it by another Nation. In this way
navigators setting out upon voyages of discovery and bearing with them a
commission from their sovereign, when coming across islands or other uninhabited
lands, have taken possession of them in the name of their Nation; and this title has
usually been respected, provided actual possession has followed shortly after.
But it is questioned whether a Nation can thus appropriate, by the mere act of
taking possession, lands which it does not really occupy, and which are more
xtensive than it can inhabit or cultivate. It is not difficult to decid& that such a
claim would be absolutely contrary to the natural law, and would conflict with the
designs of nature, which destines the earth for the needs of all mankind, and only
confers upon individual Nations the right to appropriate territory so far as they can
make use of it, and not merely to hold it against others who may wish to profit by
it. Hence the Law of Nations will only recognise the ownership and sovereignty of
a Nation over unoccupied lands when the Nation is in actual occupation of them,
when it forms a settlement upon them, or makes some actual use of them. In fact,
when explorers of other Nations had passed, leaving some sign of their having taken
possession, they have no more troubled themselves over such empty forms than over
the regulations of Popes, who divided a large part of the world between the crowns
of Castile and Portugal.
B. Disadvantages of the Requirement of Possession
The need for actual possession was not a prescription that
always found favour, even amongst its principal protagonists.
Further, it raised a number of obvious practical difficulties. First,
35E. de Vattel, 7he Law of Nations, trans. c.1758 ed. (New Yorka Oceana Publications
Inc., 1964) at 84-85.
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territory, unlike the res nuiius of Roman law (a wild horse or swarm
of bees belonging to no one), could not normally be "occupied" by
a single act. Second, there was the problem of how to deal with
lands which had an indigenous population. These two matters will
be dealt with before consideration is given to the disadvantages of
the new rule from the point of view of the colonizers.
1. Taking of Possession
There are two different approaches that were adopted to the
taking of possession of territory. One was to attempt to assimilate
the act as much as possible to the taking of possession of a horse,
a swarm of bees etc. under municipal law; the other was to invent
an entirely new doctrine, that of inchoate title.
As far as the former was concerned, there was already the
example of islands, the acquisition of which by occupatio had been
recognised by the civilians since the fourteenth century. This
possibility was expressed in modern form by the award in the
Clipperton Island arbitration as follows:36
It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the force of law, besides the
animus occupandi, the actual, and not the nominal, taking of possession is a
necessary condition of occupation. This taking of possession consists in the act, or
series of acts, by which the occupying state reduces to its possession the territory
in question and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there. Strictly speaking,
and in ordinary cases, that only takes place when the state establishes in the
territory itself an organization capable of making its laws respected. But this step
is, properly speaking, but a means of procedure to the taking of possession, and,
therefore, is not identical with the latter. There may also be cases where it is
unnecessary to have recourse to this method. Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the
fact that it was completely uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the
occupying state makes its appearance there, it the absolute and undisputed
disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of possession must be
considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed....
Despite the implication in this pronouncement that it was of
general application (i.e. if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it
was completely uninhabited, was at the absolute disposition of the
claimant state), the absolute disposition requirement was dependent
upon more than the absence of an existing population. There had
(1931) text in 26 Am. . Int. L. 390 at 393-94.
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to be some geographical limitation upon such a criterion. It could
be said of a moderately sized island or a relatively well defined area
of mainland territory that possession could be claimed ab initio of
the entire island or area. In the cases of larger islands or larger or
less well defined areas, however, the concept of "absolute and
undisputed disposition" could not readily be applied.37
To deal with the fact that settlement of claimed territories
was inevitably a slow process,38 the concept of inchoate title was
introduced to justify the priority of a first claimant's position.
As described by Hall:
3 9
An inchoate title acts as a temporary bar to occupation by another state, but it
must either be converted into a definite title within reasonable time by planting
settlements or military posts, or it must at least be kept alive by repeated local acts
showing an intention of continual claim. 'What acts are sufficient for the latter
purpose, and what constitutes a reasonable time, it would be idle to attempt to
determine. The effect of acts and of the lapse of time must be judged by the light
of the circumstances of each case as a whole. It can only be said, in a broad way,
that when territory has been duly annexed, and the fact has either been published
or has been recorded by monuments or inscriptions on the spot, a good title has
always been held to have been acquired as against a state making settlements within
37see T.J. Lawrence, The Piinciles of International Law, 7th ed. rev'd (London:
Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1929) at 152.
3 8The inevitability stemmed partly from the slowness of communications between Europe
and other areas which were the objects of colonial expansion (Africa, Asia and the Pacific
Islands), and partly from the scarcity of resources that could be allocated to colonial ventures.
The fact that much exploration was carried out by privately funded expeditions and
exploitation under the aegis of chartered companies was due to the lack of public funds for
such purposes. Moreover, as W.E. Hall pointed out in IntemationalLaw, 8th ed. (Oxford: At
the Clarendon Press, 1924) at 125:
States have not however been content to assert a right of property over territory
actually occupied at a given moment, and consequently to extend their dominionpad
pasu with the settlement of unappropriated lands. The earth-hunger of colonising
nations has not been so readily satisfied; and it would besides be often inconvenient
and sometimes fatal to the growth or perilous to the safety of a colony to confine
the property of an occupying state within these narrow limits. Hence it has been
common, with a view to future effective appropriation, to endeavour to obtain an
exclusive right to territory by acts which indicate intention and show momentary
possession, but which do not amount to continued enjoyment or control; and it has
become the practice in making settlements upon continents or large islands to
regard vast tracts of country in which no act of ownership has been done as
attendant upon the appropriated land.
391bia at 126-27. See also LF.L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, 8th ed. (New
York: D. McKay, 1955) at 558-59.
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such time as, allowing for accidental circumstances or moderate negligence, might
elapse before a force or a colony were sent out to some part of the land intended
to be occupied; but that in the course of a few years the presumption of permanent
intention afforded by such acts has died away, if they stood alone, and that more
continuous acts of actual settlement by another power became a stronger root of
title. On the other hand, when discovery, coupled with the public assertion of
ownership, has been followed up from time to time by further exploration or by
temporary lodgments in the country, the existence of a continued interest in It is
evident, and the extinction of a proprietary claim may be prevented over a long
space of time, unless more definite acts of appropriation by another state are
effected without protest or opposition.
2. Territories having an Indigenous Population
From the inception of European colonization, there had
been a doctrinal dispute, in religious and legal terms, about the
status of indigenous peoples and their rights over the land in which
they lived. At the time, it suited the apologists of the second wave
of colonizers to deny Spanish and Portuguese claims by reference to
the rights of the original inhabitants. As Grotius pointed out:40
But in addition to all this, discovery per se gives no legal rights over things unless
before the alleged discovery they were res nullius. Now these Indians of the East,
on the arrival of the Portuguese, although some of them were idolators, and ...
therefore sunk in grievous sin, had none the less perfect public and private
ownership of their goods and possessions, from which they could not be
dispossessed without just cause. The Spanish writer Victoria, following other writers
of the highest authority, has the most certain warrant for his conclusion that
Christians, whether of the laity or of the clergy, cannot deprive infidels of their civil
power and sovereignty merely on the ground that they are infidels, unless some
other wrong has been done by them.
For religious belief, as Thomas Aquinas rightly observes, does not do away with
either natural or human law from which sovereignty is derived. Surely it is a heresy
to believe that infidels are not masters of their own property;, consequently, to take
from them their possessions on account of their religious belief is no less theft and
robbery than it would be in the case of Christians.
Victoria then is right in saying that the Spaniards have no more legal right over the
East Indians becaus6 of their religion, than the East Indians would have had over
the Spaniards if they had happened to be the first foreigners to come to Spain.
By the nineteenth century, however, the inconvenience to
the colonizing powers of having to recognize the territorial rights of
.oSupra, note 33 at 12. See also M.F. Lindley, The Acquistion and Government of
Backward Tenitory in International Law (New York : Negro University Press, 1926) at 11 ff.
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the native inhabitants had become apparent. While earlier writers
had contended for or acknowledged the existence of these rights,
there was an increasing trend away from such recognition by writers
which reached its extreme point in the later part of the nineteenth
century.4  Thus, according to Oppenheim,42 only "such territory can
be the object of occupation as belongs to no State, whether it is
entirely uninhabited, for instance, an island, or inhabited by natives
whose community is not to be considered as a State". Indeed, this
attitude towards native rights was implicit in Article 35 of the Final
Act of the Congress of Berlin 1888! 3 It required signatory powers
"to insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by
them on the coasts of the African continent, sufficient to protect
existing rights". This requirement was based on the supposition
that the acquisition of sovereignty was dependent upon the
establishment of a "regular government that could guarantee the
rights of the native inhabitants, the settlers and all who traded
there".44
The complete disregard of the rights of native inhabitants
rested uneasily on the conscience of writers from Victoria on.
Lindley struggled against the rising tide of racial superiority by
suggesting that where the native peoples possessed "organised
institutions of government", it could not be said45
that the territory inhabited by such races is not under any sovereignty. Such
sovereignty as is exercised there may be of a crude and rudimentary kind, but, so
41 Lindley, supra, note 40 at 12-17.
42 Oppenheim, supra, note 39 at 555; Lawrence, sujra note 37 at 148; see also .
Westlake, Collected Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914) at 138:
it does not mean that all rights are denied to such natives, but that the appreciation
of their rights is left to the conscience of the state within whose recognised
territorial sovereignty they are compromised, the rules of international society
existing only for the purpose of regulating the mutual conduct of its members.
43Text in E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, vol. 2, 3d. ed. (London: H.M.S.O.
1909), repr. 1967, 468 at 485.
44See 3. Westlake, International Law, Part 1 (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1910)
at 109-110.
45Lindley, supra, note 40 at 20.
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long as there is some kind of authoritative control of a political nature ..., so long
as the people are under some permanent form of government, the territory should
not, it would seem, be said to be unoccupied.
Thus, it "would follow that if a tract of country were inhabited only
by isolated individuals who were not united for political action, so
that there was no sovereignty in exercise there, such a tract would
be tenitorfum nullius. 46
This understandable squeamishness towards the racial
arrogance assumed by others was reflected in certain aspects of state
practice. The acquisition of British sovereignty over Australia was
consistently explained on the ground of occupation because the
aboriginal population did not have the degree of political
organization necessary to rebut the presumption that Australia was
res nuiius at the time of the first settlement. As Gibbs J. pointed
out in Coe v. Commonwealth of Australia:
4 7
it is sought to treat the aboriginal people of Australia as a domestic dependent
nation, to use the expression which Marshall CJ. applied to the Cherokee Nation
of Indians: Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia (1831) 5, Pet. 1 at 17. However,
the history of the relationships between the white settlers and the aboriginal peoples
has not been the same in Australia and in the United States, and it ig not possible
to say, as was said by Marshall CJ. (at p. 16) of the Cherokee Nation, that the
aboriginal people of Australia are organised as a "distinct political society separated
from others!', or that they have been uniformly treated as a state. The judgments
in that case therefore provide no assistance in determining the position in
Australia-
It is fundamental to our legal system that the Australian colonies became British
possessions by settlement and not by conquest. It is hardly necessary to say that
the question is not how the manner in which Australia became a British possession
might appropriately be described. For the purpose of deciding whether the
common law was iniroduced into a newly acquired territory, a distinction was drawn
between a colony acquired by conquest or cession, in which there was an
established system of law of European type, and. a colony acquired by settlement
in a territory which, by European standards, had no civilised inhabitants or settled
law. Australia has always been regarded as belonging to the latter class: see
Cooper v. Smart (1898) 14 App. Cas. 286 at 291.
In contrast, the Maoris of New Zealand, at least in the
North Island, did have a sufficient degree of political organization
4 Ibid at 23.
47(1979), 24 A.L.R. 117 at 129. See also Lindley, supra, note 40 at 40-41; and generally,
E.Evatt, 'The Acquisition of Territory in Australia and New Zealand,' in C.H. Alexandrowicz,
ed., Grodan Society Papers (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1970) 16.
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for their chiefs to participate in the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840.
They purported to "cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England,
absolutely and without reservation, all the rights and powers of
sovereignty which the said Confederation or individual chiefs
respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or
possess over their territories as sole sovereigns thereof." As a result,
British sovereignty was proclaimed over the North Island on the
ground of cession, but over the South Island the claim was founded
upon its prior discovery by Captain Cook.48
One of the principal objections to recognizing the rights of
indigenous peoples, even where an agreement had been entered into
between their chiefs and persons acting for the colonizing power,
was that such agreements had no validity under international law
because only agreements between recognised states constituted
treaties cognisable by that law. Despite the obvious circular nature
of this belittling of such arrangements, they were nevertheless relied
upon in the allocation of boundaries, whether between claimed
territories or between spheres of influence to which claims would
later be asserted.49
Given the fact that they were not treaties, the classification
and explanation of such agreements posed obvious theoretical
481ebster claim (1925), 6 R.I.A.A 166; KJ. Keith, "International Law and New Zealand
Municipal Law' in J.F.Northey, ed., The A.G. Davies Essays in Law (London: Butterworths,
1965) at 130; Evatt, supra, note 47 at 39. It may be that the Webster decision represents a
partial reinterpretation of history (see the Island of Pabnas case, infta, note 50), because a
number of writers were of the view that British sovereignty pre-dated the Treaty of Waitangi
(Letters Patent were issued in 1839 extending the limits of the Colony of New South Wales
to include any New Zealand territory '%vhich is or may be acquired in sovereignty by her
Majesty'9, and that the Treaty was no more than a "concession to humanitarian opinion in
England and a bid for cooperation from the Maoris in New Zealand" (C.C.Aikman and
J.LRobson, "Introduction" to J.L. Robson, ed., New Zealand, 2d ed. (London: Stevens, 1967)
at 5, citing NA. Foden, The Constitutional Development of New Zealand in the First Decade
1839-1849 (Wellington: LT. Watkdns, 1938) at 56; Rutherford, he Treaty of Waitangi and the
Acquisition of British Sovereignty in New Zealand, 1849 (Auckland: Auckland University
College, 1949) at 47.
49See generally Hertslet, supra, note 43, 3 vols. These volumes contain a wide range of
agreements, some between European officials and native chiefs, others between trading
companies and such chiefs; see for example those listed involving the Royal Niger Company,
vol. 1 at 131-154.
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problems for the lawyer. Nevertheless, they did have practical
significance. As the Arbitrator said in the Island of Palmas case:50
As regards contracts between a State or a Company such as the Dutch East India
Company and native princes or chiefs orpeoples not recognised as members of the
community of nations, they are not, in the international law sense, treaties or
conventions capable of creating rights and obligations such as may, in international
law, arise out of treaties. But, on the other hand, contracts of this nature are not
wholly void of indirect effects on situations governed by international law; if they
do not constitute titles in international law, they are nonetheless facts of which the
law must in certain circumstances take account.
As to the circumstances in which the law would have to take
cognisance of such arrangements, the Award vent on to say:51
The form of the legal relations created by such contracts is most generally that of
suzerain and vassal, or of the so-called colonial protectorate.
In substance, it is not agreement between equals; it is rather a form of internal
organization of a colonial territory, on the basis of autonomy for the natives. In
order to regularise the situation as regards'other States, this organization requires
to be completed by the establishment of powers to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations imposed by international law on every State in regard to Its own
territory. And thus suzerainty over the native State becomes the basis of territorial
sovereignty as towards other members of the community of nations. It is the sum-
total of functions thus allotted either to the native authorities or to those of the
colonial Power which decides the question whether at any certain period the
conditions required for the existence of sovereignty are fulfilled. It is a question
to be decided in each case whether such a regime is to be considered as effective
or whether it is essentially fictitious, either for the whole or a part of the territory.
Regardless of whether these pronouncements were a reinterpretation
of history,52 they certainly constituted a skilful attempt to bring the
50(1928), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 at 858.
511bid. at 858-59.
52 Certainly A.S. Keller, 01. Lissitzyn & FJ. Mann, Creation of Rights of Sovereignty
through SymbolicActs 1400-1800 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938) suggested that,
for the most part, the numerous agreements made by the English and French governments
in their dealings with native peoples, even if the agreements were called "treaties", "had no
international significance, but were legislative acts on the part of the European state or devices
and subterfuges whereby domestic peace was promoted or the interests of the European
government advanced, while sovereignty at all times resided in the European state" (ibicL at
14-15). Dutch (ibid at 15-22) and Portuguese (ibid at 23-3Z) practice in the East tended
to be different. The Dutch East India Company made it a policy to seek to acquire rights by
making such agreements. This led the three authors to conclude that "very rarely did the
Christian monarchs of Europe regard these peoples as possessing sovereignty or any
recognised international status, with the possible exception of certain native 'states' in the East,
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law into line with reality. It was a development which was very
much in harmony with the subsequent attitude of the International
Court in the era of decolonization. When asked whether the
Western Sahara was "at the time of colonization by Spain a territory
belonging to no one (terra nuius)",53  the Court responded by
referring to the law in force at the time of the assumption of
Spanish sovereignty in 1884:4
Whatever differences of opinion there may have been among jurists, the State
practice of the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by tribes or
peoples having a social and political organization were not regarded as terrac nullius.
It shows that in the case of such territories the acquisition of sovereignty was not
generally considered as effected unilaterally through "occupation" of tetra nuius by
original title but through agreements concluded with local rulers. On occasion, it
is true, the world "occupation" was used in a non-technical sense denoting simply
acquisition of sovereignty;, but that did not signify that the ac4uisition of sovereignty
through such agreements with authorities of the country was regarded as an
"occupation" of a "terra nulus" in the proper sense of these terms. On the
contrary, such agreements with local rulers, whether or not considered as an actual
"cession" of the territory, were regarded as derivative roots of title, and not original
titles obtained by occupation of terrae nullus.
Although differing views had been "expressed concerning the
nature and legal value of agreements between a State and local
chiefs", the Court had not been asked "to pronounce upon the legal
character or the legality of the titles which led to Spain becoming
the administering power of Western Sahara". It had only been
asked whether Western Sahara had, at the time of colonization,
been terra nuiius. The answer was in the negative. In the Royal
Proclamation of 26 December 1884, Spa in had stated that the
territory was being taken under its protection "on the basis of
agreements which had been entered into with the chiefs of the local
tribes".
55
such as those in India or Ceylon, the Arab Kingdoms, or China, which the Portuguese and
the Dutch regarded as entities having sovereignty in the international sense and therefore the
ability to transfer it" (ibia at 150).
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C. _Problems of applying the concept of occupatio
Difficulties with the 18th century principle of occupation, as
deduced originally from Roman law rules as to occupatio of a res
nullius, were not only of a general nature. When it came to
applying the principle to specific circumstances, other shortcomings
emerged. The history of the Faldand Islands dispute provides a
striking illustration.56
To Spain and its Latin-American successors, the Falklands
(Malvinas) were part of the Spanish Empire. It was a cardinal
feature of Spanish policy to maintain the integrity of the Falklands.
It was an integrity which included a prohibition on trade
5 7
Spain had little success in the north of the Continent. The
contest was more even in the Caribbean, though France and Britain
broke the trading monopoly by seizing islands from Spain and using
them as springboards for running the gauntlet of the Spanish navy.
Only the southern part of the Continent remained intact, though the
French and English interest in the Falklands may be seen as an
attempt to employ the tactics they had used so successfully in the
Caribbean to breach the integrity of the southern mainland. In
simplified form, the following sequence of events occurred:
1764 - In April, Bougainville took formal possession of the Islands
on behalf of Louis XVI of France from a camp on East Falkland
Island.
1765 - In January, formal possession was taken of the Islands by
Britain from a camp on West Faldand Island.
1766 - The British contingent came across the French colony and
addressed a letter to its commander saying that, as the Islands had
been discovered first by a subject of the English King,58 no other
nation had a right to be there.
5 61t is not possible to deal with this matter in great detail. For further treatment, see
Donald NV. Greig, "Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands Crisis!' (1983) 8 Aust. Y.B. Int. L
20.
5 7A policy which dated back to the Papal Bull of 1493; see supra, note 30.
58This was an assertion that cannot be substantiated: see Greig, supra, note 56 at 25.
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1766 - Following protests from the Spanish government, France
agreed to forego its claim in favour of Spain, in the interests of the
Family Compact between the Bourbon rulers of the two countries,
and that Bougainvilleshould be compensated by Spain.
1767 - On 1 April, a formal handing over ceremony took place at
the French Settlement.
1770 - Spanish forces seized the British encampment. There was
the possibility of the British government falling and being replaced
by a ministry disposed to go to war with Spain.
1771 - In January, an exchange of documents took place in London
which provided for the restoration of the British possession. It
included a disclaimer by Spain that this demarche "cannot nor ought
in any wise to affect the question of the prior right of sovereignty".
1773 - The British garrison was reduced as an economy measure.
1774 - Although the British presence was withdrawn altogether, a
plaque was left which stated that the Islands were "the sole right
and property of His Most Sacred Majesty George the Third." (This
was subsequently removed and taken to Buenos Aires, where it was
recaptured 30 years later.)
1807 - The last resident Spanish governor abandoned his post.
1810 - A provisional government was established in Buenos Aires.
1811 - With increasing troubles on the mainland, the Spanish
settlement was withdrawn.
1816 - The United Provinces of Rio de Ia Plata declared their
independence, it subsequently being claimed that the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the new Latin-American states should be
taken as having occurred in 1810.
1820 - A ship from the United Provinces was sent to the Islands to
take possession of them "in the name of the country to which they
naturally appertain".
1826 - Louis Vernet undertook a second expedition to the Islands
and sought permission to establish a colony.
1828 - In a Decree of 5th January, Vernet was granted the Islands
of East Falkland and Staten. 1828 also marked the final break up
of the United Provinces with the secession of Uruguay.
1829 - Under a Decree of 10th June, Vernet was appointed
Governor of the Malvinas and Tierra del Fuego, although the
Decree itself admitted that "circumstances have hitherto prevented
1988]
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this Republic from paying the attention to that part of the Territory
which, from its importance, it demands". This formal act elicited a
protest note from Britain on 19th November, 1829, in which it was
asserted that the Islands were a British possession.
1831 - Following the arrest of two American ships by Vernet for
allegedly illegal fishing and sealing in the waters around the Islands,
and the refusal by the Argentine authorities to deliver up Vernet to
be tried by the United States for "piracy and robbery", the U.S.
Lexington destroyed the Argentine colony on the Islands. A British
naval vessel, HMS Clio, entered Port Egmont on 20th December of
that year.
1833 - On 2nd January, the Clio encountered an Argentine ship.
The British flag was raised on shore in place of the Argentine flag
which was returned to that ship. The latter then complied with an
order from the Clio to leave.
1834 - A small British presence was maintained from this year on.
1843 - The Westminster Parliament passed "An Act to enable Her
Majesty to provide for the Government of Her Settlements on the
Coast of Africa and in the Falkland Islands". A Governor was
appointed by Letters Patent.
1845 - Under the direction of the Governor, an Executive Council
and a Legislative Council were established in the course of the year.
The facts of the origins of the Falklands dispute do not fit
into any simple formula derived from Roman law. Both sides treat
the Islands as a single entity, although the initial settlements were
established in different places. On this hypothesis, there would be
some ground for claiming that the French and, therefore, the
Spanish/Argentine claim, had precedence. British apologists of the
time felt obliged to call in aid the prior discovery of the Islands by
English seafarers (an assertion, which, as has already been pointed
out, cannot be substantiated, though it was probably believed at the
time). It was this prior discovery that allegedly gave British
pretensions primacy over a contemporaneous claim by right of
possession.
Even if this special pleading of the British position could be
accepted, there is the additional difficulty arising from the sixty years
absence following the withdrawal of 1774. The argument that,
despite leaving behind the plaque, any title would have lapsed is
[VOL. 26 NO. I
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strong 9 particularly when a rival claimant was left in possession of
at least part of the disputed territory.
The last factor was not as important as it might have been,
even at the time, given that the Spanish settlement was itself
withdrawn in 1811. Britain could reasonably argue that, as the
assertion of sovereignty in the 1820s was on behalf of a new entity
(and not necessarily a successor to Spain as far as the Islands
themselves were concerned), the sovereignty issue was still open.
Britain, therefore, was just as much entitled to reassert its earlier
claim. Moreover, the crucial matter was the commencement in 1834
of an uninterrupted period of British settlement and governmental
activity.
While the practical significance of actual possession in this
form cannot be denied, there remains the problem of translating it
into legal terms. There is no doubt that conquest was a recognised
mode of territorial acquisition in the early nineteenth century,
although it usually took the form of a forced cession (i.e. express
agreement to the transfer by a defeated power under a treaty of
peace ), or of annexation by the acquiring State followed by the
acquiescence (implied assent) of the deprived power. Similarly, in
the case of acquisitive prescription (adverse possession), the theory
(drawn from municipal law) was that the transfer of title was
dependent upon the acquiescence of the former sovereign. In the
case of the Falklands, it was difficult to coiftend that Argentina had
at any time consented to British possession of the Islands, given that
there have been intermittent protests over most of the 150 year
period. This included an offer to arbitrate the dispute as long ago
as 1844. An American or British response would be of the view
that title would be perfected in the interests of international stability
5 9Hence Lindley's observation (supra, note 40 at 51) that 'it cannot be said that the
notice left on the fort was sufficient evidence, over the whole intervening period, of [Britain's]
intention to retake the islands, and it would appear that any rights they may have had in 1774
had been abandoned long before 1832" (brackets added).
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and legal order, even if the act of annexation was followed only by
"an exercise of sovereignty over it for some time".60
In opposition to such attitudes, Argentina could rely upon
the twin pillars of public order that Latin American states of the
region strove to establish in their relations which each other and the
outside world. These are the principles uti possidetis and "no
conquest". The object of the first principle (less important in the
Falklands context because of the existence of competing claims in
1810 and of the withdrawal of the Spanish settlement after that
date) was that the new states that emerged from the Spanish Empire
after 1810 were the successors to the entire territory of the
administrative units of the former Empire and out of which they
themselves were formed.61
The "no conquest" principle, in its application to the
southern part of the continent, was linked in spirit to the Monroe
doctrine: the United States and the southern Republics were in
harmony in wishing to prevent future conquests by European
powers. Although the United States was not prepared to commit
60E. Maxey, International Law with illustrative Cases (St Louis: F.H. Thomas Law Book,
1906) at 144; Lawrence, supra, note 37 at 159-160; an approach endorsed by A.S. Hershey,
The Essentials of International Public Law and Organisation, revd ed. (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1939) at 278-9; H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Oxford: At
the Clarendon Press, 1936) being a reprint of the 8th ed. 1866 at 200, the original being
quoted by 3. Westlake, International Law, Part I (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1910)
at 112. There were even those who suggested that undisturbed possession alone was sufficient:
see Hall, supra, note 38 at 566-569.
61As the Tribunal explained in the Beagle Channel Arbitration (1978) 17 Int. Leg. Mat.
634 at 645:
As the Court understands the matter, the doctrine has two main aspects. First, all
territory in Spanish America, however remote or inhospitable, is deemed to have
been part of one of the former administrative divisions of Spanish colonial rule
(vice-royalties, captaincies-general, etc.). Hence there is no territory in Spanish-
America that has the status of res nullius open to an acquisition of title by
occupation. Secondly, the title to any given locality is deemed to have become
automatically vested in whatever Spanish-American State inherited or took over the
former Spanish administrative division in which the locality concerned was situated
(uti possidetis, ita possideatis, - the full formula). Looked at in another way, ui
possidetis was a convenient method of establishing the boundaries of the young
Spanish-American States on the same basis as those of the old Spanish
administrative divisions, except that the latter were themselves often uncertain or
ill-defined or, in the less accessible regions, not factually established at all, - or again
underwent various changes.
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itself to military action on behalf of its neighbours to the south, it
tried to encourage them to enter into mutual undertakings for their
own protection and to serve as a warning to would-be European
predators. 62 The Treaty of Lima 1848,63 although it never came into
force, was typical of the many' reassertions of the overriding
principle. Article 11.1 of that instrument specified certain acts as
constituting breaches of the treaty, including the situation that would
arise if "any foreign nation shall occupy or attempt to occupy any
portion of the territory included within the boundaries of the
Confederated Republics, or shall make use of force to exclude such
territory from under the rule and domain of the said republic under
any pretence whatsoever".
In both the writings of the Anglo-American school and in
the attitude and actions of Latin American countries, there are
illustrations of the attempt to explain or mould international law to
suit the special interests of the states concerned. The consequence
will often be that, in relation to a particular dispute, there are
differing rules which support the claims of the rival states. This can
be clearly seen in the investment disputes over the past twenty
years or so, when capital exporting and importing countries have
advanced conflicting rules to be applied in disagreements between
then as to the applicable law and as to the. assessment of
compensation for a particular asset that has been taken over by the
capital importer. The Falklands dispute has some similarities,
although the outcome could depend in part upon one of two factors:
whether the Falklands should be considered as part of (formerly
Spanish) Latin America and subject to the "no conquest" principle;
or as a territory falling outside that political region and subject to
acquisition by the general rules of international law applicable at the
relevant time. To a large extent, the issue of whether the Falklands
were politically part of Latin America, was unresolved in the period
1764-1832 and has remained so until this day.
62See generally A. Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrpne Its Importance in the International Life
of the States of the New World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924) at 165-191.
63 Ibia. at 171. For a brief survey of other examples, see Greig, supra, note 56 at 52-54.
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D. Subsequent developments in the law of territorial acquisition
A number of the inadequacies in the classical doctrine, which
required actual possession as a basis for acquiring title through
occupation, have already been considered. Two particular problems
are worth emphasising: the fact that, given the size of the territories
involved, the acquiring state could not assume possession with
immediate effect (hence the invention of the notion of inchoate
title); and the existence of an indigenous population with whom, in
many cases, various treaties or agreements had been made by
officials or representatives of the acquiring state.
The changing attitudes towards this last problem and the way
in which the status of the native peoples has gradually been
reinterpreted by international law have already been dealt with.
This reinterpretation has come about, in more recent years at any
rate, as a result of pressures exerted by the new states of Africa and
Asia, whose inhabitants are the descendants of the very peoples
whose rights and interests international law and society so long
ignored.
Even if this issue is put to one side and the matter of
possession is examined more closely, it is apparent that a rule based
upon the need to establish physical control over territory (even
when coupled with inchoate title) was inconvenient to the colonizing
powers. The tyranny of distance and the scarcity of resources led to
claims being made to vast areas of hinterland on the basis of coastal
settlements of relatively small size. By the end of the century,
hinterland as a doctrine was of decreasing practical relevance as the
colonizing powers divided up the interior of the African continent
between them by agreement.64 Its uncertainty as a legal principle
was due largely to the fact that jurists explained the circumstances
which it was intended to cover in a different way.
Hinterland doctrine (or the sector principle) was based upon
a quasi-geometrical construct that land lying "behind" a coastline
64See Lindley, supra note 40 at 234-35. The concept, together with, or transformed into,
the so-called sector principle, continued to exercise an influence in polar regions: see F.M.
Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1982) at 17-31.
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already legitimately under the sovereignty of the claimant could also
be claimed. The boundaries of the claim would be on some
equidistance allocation between adjoining states in a manner similar
to that later adopted in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf for the division of off-shore rights. Where the
territory claimed abutted a polar region the division would, however,
take account of this fact by making the construct by lines drawn
from the outer edges of the claimed coastline or territory to the
pole itself,
The weakness of an assertion of title on such a basis alone
was that the claimant would have no actual possession or control
over the inland territory to which the claim related. Legal theory,
to justify claims to inland or contiguous areas, took an elastic view
of what was necessary for such possession. In the Cl pperton Island
case 65 the Award equated the taking of possession with a situation
where a territory, because of the circumstances, was "at the absolute
and undisputed disposition" of the claimant 6 6 The transposition of
possession, meaning physical possession of at least a significant part
of the territory claimed, to some less tactile concept was more
apparent in the terminology used by the arbitrator in the Island of
Palnas case.67 Having asserted that "practice, as well, as doctrine,
recognises - though under different legal formulae and with certain
differences as to the conditions required -. that the continuous and
peaceful display of territorial sovereignty (peaceful in relation to
other States) is as good as title",c the arbitrator referred to the
"principle that continuous and peaceful display of the functions of
State within a given region is a constituent element of territorial
sovereignty. 69  This rationale was very much a product of the
requirement of Article 35 of the Berlin Final Act 1885 with its
65Supra, note 36.
66(1931) 26 Am. . Int. L. 390 at 394.
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emphasis on the need for a claimant to be in a position to protect
the rights of others.70 It was also a sign of a further aspect of legal
development in line with the requirements of colonization. Because
of the size of the territories being claimed in relation to the
resources that could be allocated to the task by the claimants, these
manifestations of occupation were largely by decree rather than by
actual settlement. In case of Australia, a coastal presence was the
basis of claims to vast areas of unexplored territory. The legal seal
of approval to such policies was given by the Permanent Court in
the Eastern Greenland case.!
Parts of the Eastern Greenland coast had been used for
centuries by seamen from Norway as temporary bases when they had
been fishing and sealing in the area. There were a number of
Danish settlements on the western and southern coasts of
Greenland, but Denmark let it be known that it intended to pass
legislation covering activities in the remainder of the island. One of
the purposes of the legislation was to exclude all foreigners,
including the Norwegians, from the coasts and waters of eastern
Greenland. Faced with this threat, the Norwegian government put
forward a claim of its own to a part of eastern Greenland, alleging
that it was terra nulius and, therefore, open to occupation by
Norway.... The Court rejected this possibility, upholding the Danish
case* that the whole island was subject to the sovereignty of
Denmark. In the circumstances, Denmark had sufficiently
established its claim before the critical date, that is, the
announcement by Norway of its occupation of the territory in
question.
70Supra, note 43. Hence the arbitrator's comment, 2 R.AA. at 839:
Territorial sovereignty, as has already been said, involves the exclusive right to
display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation
to protect within the territory the rights of other States, in particular their right to
integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together with the rights which each
State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory. Without m.anifestlng its
territorial sovereignty in a manner corresponding to circumstances, the State cannot
fulfil this duty. Territorial sovereignty cannot limit itself to its negative side, i.e. to
excluding the activities of other States; for it serves to divide between nations the
space upon which human activities are employed, in order to assure them at all
points the minimum of protection of which international law is the guardian.
71(1933), P.C.LJ. Ser. A/B, No. 53.
[VOL 26 NO. 1
The International Lawyer's Dilemma
In reaching this conclusion, the Court discarded any notion
of possession of, in the sense of a physical presence in, the disputed
territory. In its view "a claim to sovereignty based not upon some
particular act or title such as a treaty of cession but merely upon
continued display of authority, involves two elements each of which
must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign
and some actual exercise or display of such authority."72
IV. ANTARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY
It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal in detail with the
factual elements behind the claims to territorial sovereignty over
parts of Antarctica by Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New
Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom. The relevant matter is
the way in which the Eastern Greenland case was used as authority
supporting the various claims. Most notably, two aspects of the
decision were relied upon. The first, was that actual possession of
the disputed territory, in the form of a physical presence on, seemed
to have been discarded. The second concerned the Court's
admission that:
73
In most cases involving claims to territorial sovereignty which have come before an
international tribunal, there have been two competing claims to the sovereignty, and
the tribunal has had to decide which of the two is the stronger....
It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to territorial
sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tribunal has been satisfied with
72bkid at 45-46.
73 lbid at 46. See also the following remarks of the arbitrator in the Island of Palmas
case (1928), 2 RLLA.A. 829 at 840:
Manifestations of territorial sovereignty assume, it is true, different forms, according
to conditions of time and place. Although continuous in principle, sovereignty
cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on every point of a territory. The
intermittence and discontinuity compatible with the maintenance of the right
necessarily differ according as inhabited or uninhabited regions are. involved, or
regions enclosed within territories in which sovereignty is incontestably displayed or
again regions accessible from, for instance, the high seas. It is true that
neighbouring States may by convention fLx limits to their own sovereignty, even in
regions such as the interior of scarcely explored continents where such sovereignty
is scarcely manifested, and in this way each may prevent the other from any
penetration of its territory. The delimitation of Hinterland may also be mentioned
in this connection.
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very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the
other State could not make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the
case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled countries.
It was argued therefore that, given the similarity between
Antarctica and Greenland as far as terrain and climate were
concerned, Antarctic sovereignty had been established by the time
of the Antarctic Treaty on the basis of legislative and other
governmental acts, together with intermittent exploration and
research activity. The absence of any physical possession or control
(other than research bases at specific locations) of the area in
question was excused because of its remote and inhospitable nature.
For example, in the view of the Australian government:
74
Australia's title in international law rests on acts of discovery and formal claims
of title by British and Australian explorers, the formal transfer of the territory from
Britain to Australia and Australian acceptance by legislation, and subsequent acts
showing an intention by Australia to exercise sovereignty over the Territory. This
intention is demonstrated, inter alia, by the application by Australia of legislation
to the Territory, the negotiation and conclusion of Treaties affecting the Territory
and by engagement in a degree of administrative activity there. Having regard to
the particular conditions experienced in Antarctica, a principal form of Australian
administrative activity is related to the presence of Australian scientific research
bases and a program of exploration and scientific work in the Australian Antarctic
Territory.
Australian writers have been less sanguine about their country's
position, although they have favoured the view that Australia at least
has a priority in areas subject to its claims which international law
will, for the time being, protect.
75
There are a number of weaknesses in this thesis which will
be addressed soon. But, there are additional factors at work which
74 Written answer of 22 November 1979 by Mr. Peacock, Minister for Foreign Affairs
(Aust. H.R. Deb. 1979, Vol. 116, para 3502; 8 Aust. Y.B. Int. L. at 306). See to similar effect
a statement by Senator Webster, the Minister of Science, on 24 August 1977 (Aust. S. Deb.
1977, Vol. 74, paras 443-4; 7 Aust. Y.B. Int. L at 454); and the evidence given by Mr. E.
Lauterpacht Q.C. to the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Territorial Boundaries on 12
October 1977 (8 Aust. Y.B. Int. L at 306-307).
75 See G. Triggs, "Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica" Part 11 (1982) 13 Melb. Univ. L.
Rev. 302 at 332; AC. Castles, 'The International Status of the Australian Antarctic Territory"
in O'Connell, ed., International Law In Australia, 1st ed. (London: Stevens, 1965) at 355-56.
For a divergent opinion, see Donald W. Greig 'Territorial Sovereignty and the Status of
Antarctica" (1978) 32 Aust. Outlook 117.
1988] The International Lawyer's Dilemma 165
are undermining the position of the claimant states. Since 1961, the
Antarctic Treaty has provided a basis upon which a regime has
developed for the adjustment of the interests of consultative
parties7 6 to ensure the peaceful administration of activities taking
place there. The Treaty itself appears to retain the status quo by
virtue of Article IV which provides:
77
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: (a) a
renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its
activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; (b) prejudicing the
position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of
any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial
7 6The original parties to the Treaty which included, in addition to the claimant States
listed in the text, Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the United States and the Soviet Union. By
Article XIII, the Treaty is "open for accession by any State which is a member of the United
Nations, or by any other State which may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent
of all Contracting Parites whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings
provided for under Article IX of the Treaty." It is the latter provision which establishes the
notion that certain States are entitled to "consultative" status i.e., to consult together "on
matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and
recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives
of the Treaty' (Article IX.1). The same paragraph bestows this right on the Contracting
Parties "named in the preamble to the present Treaty' (i.e. the original members) and Article
L'.2 does so with respect to Contracting Parties acceding to the Treaty under Article XIII, but
only "during such time as that Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by
conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific
station or the dispatch of a scientific research expedition." Among States that have qualified
for consultative status under this requirement are (with date of accession as well as subsequent
acceptance as having so qualified): Poland (1961) (1977); Brazil (1978) (1983); F.R.G. (1979)
(1981); Uruguay (1980) (1985); P.R.C. (1983) (1985); India (1983).
7 7Parallel provisions have been included in various instruments adopted for the regulation
of activities taking place within the Antarctic Treaty area, defined by Article VI as "the area
south of 60 degrees South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty
shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under
international law with regardto the high seas within the area!' In the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980, the invitation was issued to States
making use of the resources of the waters in the area, to join in the conservation regime
provided for in the Convention. Article IV of that instrument contained a reaffirmation of
the principles contained in Article IV of the Treaty itself.See also the Convention on the
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Acvtivities 1988, Article 9.
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sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
However, there is no doubt that the activities of two non-
claimants, the Soviet Union and the United States, greatly outweigh
in significance the activities of other states. While those two
countries have rejected the validity of existing claims to sovereignty,
they have not excluded the possibility of one day becoming claimants
themselves. If the Treaty were to come to an end, the protection of
Article IV would be removed and other states would be faced with
a Soviet and American presence on a much greater scale than in
1961.
The mere fact of inter-state regulation of Antarctic activities
is to diminish the significance of assertions of sovereignty. The
incantation of Article IV becomes an increasingly hollow ritual. In
the recent negotiations for a minerals regime to cover the
eventuality of the discovery of land based resources which would be
economically viable to exploit, the demands of the claimants for
recognition of some priority for them struck an unsympathetic
response. If territorial rights mean anything, then they should have
received some recognition in the context of a minerals regime.
78
To return to the discussion of the pre-existing weakness of
the claimants' position, their real difficulty stems from a misunder-
standing of the legal situation, based upon a misinterpretation of the
relevant authorities. The basis of their view seems to be that the
Eastern Greenland case represented the law until the time the
Antarctic Treaty came into force and that activities of states like
Australia satisfied the minimum control requirements applicable to
such a remote and inhospitable region. Insofar as international law
might have been changing to meet the demands of post-1945
78The degree of recognition under the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities 1988 is minimal. The most significant mention of the claimants' position is
to be found in the membership of Regulatory Committees provided for in Article 29.2. In
addition, by Article 32, the voting position of the claimant states as a group in decision
making by the Regulatory Committees may be of some importance. These Committees have
the power, in accordance with Article 31, inter alia to approve Management Schemes and issue
exploration and development permits, as well as to monitor exploration and development
activities, in areas identified by the Commission under Article 41 for the possible exploration
and development of a particular mineral resource or resources.
[VOL. 26 NO. I
The International Lawyer's Dilemma
international society, it could be explained by reference to the
concept of the intertemporal law "Which subjects the act creative of
a right to the law in force at the time the right arises"; and tests
"the existence of the right, in other words its continued
manifestation" by reference to "the conditions required by the
evolution of the law."79 In other words, Australia's title was valid by
the law in force prior to the time when legal changes began and its
activities were sufficient to preserve that existing title even in the
new order that developed in the post war era.80
The fallacy is, of course, that there is no acceptance of the
proposition that Australia's sovereignty had become established
according to the less stringent criteria that international tribunals
were once prepared to apply in territorial disputes in various
"remote" areas. Despite the lip-service paid to occupation as a
traditional mode of acquisition, it had long since lost its municipal
law characteristics of "intention" plfs "act". The "act" had become
"activities" and the activities extended over lengthy periods of time.
The process of acquisition had become one of historical consoli-
dation. In such a case, the concept of consolidation required a
different application of the principle of the intertemporal law.
Because the process is an extended one, it must be assessed by
reference to the changing requirements of the law in order to
ascertain whether title has been definitively established. In the case
of Antarctic claims, it is difficult to show that title had become
definitively established. Until that situation occurs the maintenance
of a particular claim, depends upon the changing requirements of
the law as to acquisition, including the effects of the Antarctic
Treaty.
There is a second ground for suggesting that the earlier
precedents have been misunderstood. Commentators have explained
the minimal manifestations of sovereignty by reference to the remote
79 sland of Patrnas case (1928), 2 R.I.AA. 829 at 845.
8 0see G. Triggs, "Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica" Part 1 (1981) 13 Melb. U. L. Rev.
123 at 145-55.
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and sparsely populated nature of the territory in question.81
Reference is also made to the fact that, in choosing between rival
claimants, victory went to the party which pointed to the greater
connection with the territory, even though the contact had in fact
been minimal! 2  The crucial point in these various cases would
seem to be, however, the absence of external interest; a
preparedness on the part of other states to allow an allocation of
sovereignty to be made between the contesting states.83 The
references by international tribunals to the remote and inhospitable
nature of the territory and the scarceness or absence of a population
are explicable, in part, by the fact that such territories are unlikely
to give rise to the interest of possible alternative claimants.
It is in this respect that Antarctica differs fundamentally from
the territorial disputes considered in cases like Eastern Greenland or
Palmas. Antarctica has been a matter of concern to states other
than the claimants. Both the Soviet Union and the United States
have refused to acknowledge the validity of existing claims on the
ground that the requirements of international law for the acquisition
of sovereignty have not be satisfied. However, both countries have
let it be known that, if some lesser standard were applied, they
believe that they have grounds for submitting claims of their own.
84
What remains unclear, of course, is the extent to which "permanent"
scientific bases with a changing "population" could constitute a
81 See Triggs, ibhd at 139; Castles, supra, note 75 at 350-351, 353-356; H. Waldock,
"Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island Dependencies" (1948) 25 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 311
at 324-325, 334-337, 344-345.
82see Triggs supra, note 80 at 129, 143-144.
83This was certainly true in the Eastern Greenland case (1933), PC.IJ. Ser. A/B, No. 53
in which various governments that might have had an interest in opposing Denmark's claim
were approached, but each of them "replied in terms which satisfied the Danish Government"
(at 37). In the Clipperton Island arbitration (1931), 26 Am. J. Int. L. 390, a report that
Britain had designs on the island was "afterwards acknowledged to be inaccurate" (at 392), and
the United States, when faced by a demand for an explanation by France of the fact that an
American flag had been sighted on the island, "responded that it ... did not intend to claim
any right of sovereignty over Clipperton" (ibid).
8 4see P. A. Toma, 'The Soviet Attitude towards the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty
in the Antarctic' (1956) 50 Am J. Int. L 611; Auburn, supra, note 64 at 61-78 (USA), 78-
83 (USSR).
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settlement from which to give some semblance of control over
surrounding areas.
V. THE DILEMMA RECONSIDERED
The purpose of this paper is not to foretell the future as far
as Antarctic sovereignty is concerned. The purpose of the discussion
of the rules of territorial acquisition has been to demonstrate the
way in which their development has been influenced by the interests
and demands of the colonizing powers. It was a struggle for
supremacy in which the victims had no say. Only in more recent
times have the rules once more been reexamined in the light of the
needs of the new Third World states. As far as the Antarctica is
concerned, the Antarctic Treaty, despite Article IV, is gradually
modifying the position of the claimants. Even if Third World
interest in establishing a regime there based upon the common
heritage principle may be on the wane, the .notion that the area has
an international status based upon international regulation within the
present Treaty has come to be accepted by claimants and non-
claimants alike.
What has the discussion of the rules of territorial acquisition
to say about the inherent conflict between law as a fetter on state
conduct and the interest of states to have maximum freedom to act
as they wish? First, the rules as to acquisition of territory were
moulded and re-articulated over an extensive period of time; they
were not subject to violent and sudden change. Second, in addition
to the corpus of legal rules, various special regimes have been
established to preserve the international order, some partly legal,
partly political, and others more obviously political in nature. The
Final Act of the Berlin Congress and the Antarctic Treaty fall into the
former category, the concept of spheres of influence falls into the
latter category.
The nineteenth century conception of a sphere of influence
was intimately bound up with the acquisition of territory. For the
most part, spheres of influence took the form of agreements or
understandings between colonizing powers with respect to the areas
within which they could be guaranteed a free hand to extend their
control to establish sovereignty. At times, ii a less formal way, they
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denoted an application of the notion of contiguity. A colonizing
power would have priority in establishing sovereignty over areas
adjoining an existing and recognised claim85
In the contemporary world of superpower politics, the concept
of spheres of influence constitutes one of the rules of the game for
the ordering of international society and the avoidance of nuclear
war.86 It has its most obvious manifestation in the Brezhnev
doctrine. In August 1968, troops from the Soviet Union and other
Warsaw Pact countries entered Czechoslovakia to suppress the
liberalization movement that had developed in that country's ruling
Communist Party. This action was subsequently justified by Soviet
President Brezhnev in a speech in Poland in December 1968. The
substance of what he said had already appeared in a Pravda article
of September 1968,87 in which it was stated:
The peoples of the socialist countries and Communist parties certainly do have and
should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective
countries. However none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their
country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, and the whole
working class movement, which is working for socialism. This means that each
Communist party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the
socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement.
It followed therefore that:s8
the Communists of the fraternal countries could not allow the socialist states to
be inactive in the name of an abstractly understood sovereignty, when they saw that
the country stood in peril of antisocialist degeneration.
The actions in Czechoslovakia of the five allied socialist countries accords also with
the vital interests of the people of the country themselves.
American actions in Grenada and Nicaragua project a "mirror
image." One of the principal criticisms (apart from doubts raised
85Lindley, supra, note 40 at 207 ff.
86see generally P. Keal, Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance (New York: St
Martin's Press, 1983).
8 7"Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries" (1968) 7 Int. Leg. Mat.
1323.
881bid at 1324.
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as to their legality) 89 has been that they appear to legitimize the
Soviet attitude towards states falling within their sphere of influence
in Eastern Europe and, more recently, in the context of Afghanistan.
Despite Bull's views towards the, passive attitude of
international law with respect to breaches of its rules, there is an
underlying distinction between the approach of the Soviet Union
and that of the United States. A right of Soviet intervention is
openly claimed for states within its orbit as a matter governed by
termsof "Socialist International Legal Principles and Norms" 90
According to Tunidn.91
As an aspect of interstate relations, the principle of socialist internationalism is the
result of applying the principle of proletarian internationalism to relations between
states of the socialist type. Proletarian internationalism has signified and does
signify above all the unity of the proletariat of various countries in the class struggle
against capital for a socialist reconstruction of society. Therefore, the principle of
socialist internationalism as a principle of relations among socialist states signifies
above all the unity of the socialist states in that class struggle between socialism and
capitalism which takes place in the international arena in specific forms and which
comprises the basic content of contemporary international relations. An important
part of this struggle is the joint defense of the socialist system from any attempts
of forces of the old world to destroy or subvert any socialist state of this system.
In contrast, the United States has preferred to explain its
conduct by reference to recognised exceptions to the proscription of
the use of force in Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter. The
Grenada action was variously justified on the grounds of the
invitation of the Governor, the right of humanitarian intervention to
protect the safety of American nationals and the authorization
granted by the Organisation of East Caribbean States&2 American
8 90n Grenada, see F.A.Boyle et aL, "International Lawlessness in Grenada" (1984) 78
Am. J. Int. L 172; for Nicaragua, see the judgment of the International Court in the
Aicaragua case, [1986] I.CJ. Rep. 14.
90This is the title given by G.I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Cambridge: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1974) to Chapter 19 of his book.
911bI at 434; see also at 440; W.E. Butler, "Socialist Principles of International
Relations'?" (1971) 65 Am. I Int. Law 796; N. Rostow, ".aw and the Use of Force by States:
the Brezhnev Doctrine" (1981) 7 Yale 3. World Pub. Order 209.
92J.N. Moore, "Grenada and the International Double Standard" (1984) 78 Am. . Int.
L. 145; CJ. Joyner, "Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion" (1984) 78 Am. . Int. L 131.
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policy towards Nicaragua has been explained on the basis of the
need for the United States to act in the exercise of a right of
collective self-defence in conjunction with states neighbouring
Nicaragua. They claimed to be threatened by the latter's alleged
attempts to export the Sandinista revolution?3
In the Nicaragua case,94 the International Court was
prepared to rely upon the American plea to have acted in collective
self-defence as an acceptance by the United States of the continued
validity of the overriding proscription contained in Article 2.4 of the
Charter. However, it seems to fly in the face of reality to suggest,
as did the Court, that such reaffirmation of the rule had the effect
of strengthening rather than weakening it, particularly when the
openly avowed purpose of the American support of the Contras was
to overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Despite the
Court's comments, the danger of the American actions was that, in
complying with the pattern set by the Soviet view of the solidarity
of like-minded states, they would be sanctioning not just the political
acceptability of such conduct, but also laying the foundation for its
reception into the legal order.
This danger is perhaps more real than is generally
acknowledged. When mention was made95 of the doctrinal
distinction between hard and soft law, it was pointed out that some
of the rules in the latter category were based upon standards of
practice that did not satisfy the strict requirements prescribed by the
International Court on the basis of Article 38.1.b of its Statute.
Could it not be argued that some concept of spheres of influence
has become accepted as soft law, bestowing upon each of the
superpowers rights of intervention to preserve the stability of their
own region in the greater interests of the preservation of global
peace and the avoidance of nuclear war?
93J.N. Moore, "'The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order"
(1986) 80 Am. 3. Int. L. 43; J.P. Rowles, "'Secret War', Self-Defense and the Charter - a
Reply to Professor Moore" (1986) S0 Am. J. Int. L 568.
9 4See, supra note 22, [1986] I.CJ. 14 at 98.
95Supra, note 26.
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The reason for rejecting this analogy is found in the nature
of the rules which have been advanced on the ground that they
constitute soft law. Hitherto, the rules of soft law have been
essentially altruistic in nature, in that they have sought to redress
the social and economic inequalities of the world.P6 They conform
to notions of distributive justice. The same cannot be said of a
"spheres of influence" doctrine. It is essentially egocentric, designed
to serve the personal interests of the superpowers to the detriment
of the rights of those states and peoples which fall, willingly or
unwillingly, within the relevant sphere. Superpower dominance is
the antithesis of the concepts of the equality and independence of
states and of the notion of self-determination and of the rights of
peoples. Bull, who saw principally a positivist world of realpolitik,
was largely indifferent to such factors. The conflict is crucial to
writers of a naturalist persuasion who see law as more than a hollow
reflection of state conduct. It is a question of values, for it is values
which, as "standards (criteria) for establishing what should be
regarded as desirable, provide the grounds for accepting or rejecting
particular norms."
97
The Bull approach is to devalue law, or at least to ascribe to
it values of a by-gone age. Speaking of the lat nineteenth century
phenomenon of colonization, Puchala and Hopkins had this to say:
98
But much more important than the characteristic transaction flows of colonialism
were the interaction patterns in relations among imperial powers ... There was a
pronounced competitiveness amongst metropoles as each country sought to
establish, protect, and expand its colonial domains against rivals. Yet there was also
a sense of limitation or constraint in major-power relations, ... evidenced in periodic
96One of the obstacles to progress has been the state centred view of the present
international order. A weakness of the New International Economic Order was its insistence
upon the rights of the developing states to receive the benefits of wealth redistribution without
any means of ensuring that their people would actually share in those benefits. Hence redress
of the existing inequalities throught the implementation of such rights seems to be a distant
prospect: see Bull, supra, note 1 at 90, citing J. Stone, "Approaches to the Notion of
International Justice" in RAL Falk & C. E. Black, eds, The Future of International Legal Order:
Trends and Patterns, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) at 372.
97R. M. Williams Jr.,"The Concept of Values," rnternational Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, Vol. 16 (New York: The MacMillan Co. & The Free Press, 1968) 283 at 284.
98 "International Regimes: Lessons From Inductive Analysis" (1982) 36 Int. Org. 245 at
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diplomatic conferences summoned to sort out colonial issues ... Constraint (was] ..
also reflected in doctrines like "spheres of influence" ..., which endorsed the notion
that sharing and subdivision were in order.
Overall, however, as these writers went on to point out:
°9
The legitimacy of colonization was collectively endorsed by the metropolitan
governments and, after 1870, by overwhelming cross-sections of national populations
- including Americans. It was this overriding sense of legitimacy, the conviction that
imperialism and colonization were right, that all means towards colonial ends were
justified, and that international management to preserve major-powei imperialism
was appropriate, that contributed to the durability of the system.
The contemporary climate in its attitude towards spheres of
influence is vastly different. The superpowers do not hold the law-
making and rule-making monopoly that the colonial powers held
towards the end of the last century. Even McDougal, in his policy-
oriented approach to international law and society, regarded the role
of decision makers as constrained by an objective standard of
reasonableness: "[flor all types of controversies the one test that is
invariably applied by decision-makers is that simple and ubiquitous,
but indispensable, standard of what, considering all relevant policies
and all variables in context, is reasonable as between the parties."
100
The guardians of what is reasonable can hardly be the parties
to a particular dispute. However much they should take account of
that standard, they are unlikely to be able to judge objectively what
is reasonable. The importance of their own interests is bound to
give the subjective slant to their assessment of that criterion. Hence
the application of the requirement is dependent upon the reactions
of the decision-makers of states not personally involved in the
situation.i0
991bi at 254.
10 0M. MeDougal & N. Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security" (1955) 64 Yale L J. 648 at 660, quoting a passage from N. Smith, The
Law and Custom of the Sea (London: Stevens, 1950) at 20 which included the following:
The law of nations which is neither enacted nor interpreted by any visible authority
universally recognised, professes to be the application of reason to international
conduct.
101Supra, note 21.
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Given the size of the present international community as
compared with the position in 1900, there is a greater chance of the
objective standard being sufficiently endorsed to overcome the
predilections of the superpowers and their most constant supporters.
For this reason, it is more likely that the just demands of the third
world for greater equity in the distribution of economic benefits will
be received into international law than will the egocentric views of
the superpowers as to their rights in relation to the countries and
peoples subject to their hegemony.
Ultimately, therefore, international law can be seen as a vehicle
for justice. The more unreasonable actions of states, however
powerful, can be categorised as unlawful even if there may be no
immediate possibility of redress to states affected by such conduct!1 °2
102The international community may thus be seen as in the process of moving away from
the outmoded concept of world order based upon the balance of power so fundamental to
Bull's thinking (supra, notes 3, 4) though it is as yet unclear what model is likely to replace
it. It certainly will not be any concept of world government. As R.A. Falk has pointed out
(R.A. Falk et aL, International Law: A Contemporary Perspective (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press,1985) at 668-669):
... the balance of power approach to world order is increasingly incapable of
satisfying the needs of principal governments or their most powerful constituencies,
whereas a utopian fantasy of world government is unconnected with any plausible
transition scenario.
The other possibilities considered by Falk (ibi. at 673) are what he terms the "Concert of
Multinational Corporate Elites" and "Global Populism". It is the latter, of course, which is in
keeping with the philosophy behind such writings as S.S. Kim, The Quest for a Just World
Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), see esp. Ch. 3 "In Search of a World Order
Theory."

